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Inertia and Decision Making
Carlos Alós-Ferrer *, Sabine Hügelschäfer and Jiahui Li
Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
Decision inertia is the tendency to repeat previous choices independently of the outcome,
which can give rise to perseveration in suboptimal choices. We investigate this tendency
in probability-updating tasks. Study 1 shows that, whenever decision inertia conflicts with
normatively optimal behavior (Bayesian updating), error rates are larger and decisions are
slower. This is consistent with a dual-process view of decision inertia as an automatic
process conflicting with a more rational, controlled one. We find evidence of decision
inertia in both required and autonomous decisions, but the effect of inertia is more clear
in the latter. Study 2 considers more complex decision situations where further conflict
arises due to reinforcement processes. We find the same effects of decision inertia
when reinforcement is aligned with Bayesian updating, but if the two latter processes
conflict, the effects are limited to autonomous choices. Additionally, both studies show
that the tendency to rely on decision inertia is positively associated with preference for
consistency.
Keywords: inertia, decision making, Bayesian updating, multiple processes, perseveration, preference for
consistency
1. INTRODUCTION
As described in Newtonian physics, the term “inertia” refers to the fact that, in the absence
of external resistance, a moving object will keep moving in the same direction. This word has
also been used across multiple fields as a metaphor to describe related characteristics of human
behavior. For example, in management and organization science, the expression “cognitive inertia”
describes the phenomenon that managers might fail to reevaluate a situation even in the face of
change (Huff et al., 1992; Reger and Palmer, 1996; Hodgkinson, 1997; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).
In medical studies, “therapeutic inertia” or “clinical inertia” describe the failure of health care
providers to intensify therapy when treatment goals are unattained (Phillips et al., 2001; Okonofua
et al., 2006). In sociology, “social inertia” depicts the resistance to change or the (excess) stability
of relationships in societies or social groups (Bourdieu, 1985). In psychology, the “inertia effect”
describes individuals’ reluctance to reduce their confidence in a decision following disconfirming
information (Pitz and Reinhold, 1968). The concept of “psychological inertia” has been proposed
to describe the tendency to maintain the status-quo (Gal, 2006). Suri et al. (2013) speak of “patient
inertia” to describe the phenomenon that many patients stick to inferior options or fail to initiate
treatment even after the diagnosis of a medical problem.
Summing up, the concept of inertia has been used to describe many different phenomena related
to a resistance to change. The existence of these phenomena has been linked to status-quo bias
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Ritov and Baron, 1992), described as the tendency to maintain
the defaults either by repeating a decision or avoiding action. So far, however, our understanding
of the processes underlying inertia in decision making is rather limited. In the present study, we
aim to contribute to this understanding by focusing on a particular facet of inertia, which we
term “decision inertia:” the tendency to repeat a previous choice, regardless of its outcome, in a
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subsequent decision. We investigate whether this tendency
significantly influences active decision making and explore the
psychological processes behind it using a belief-updating task.
The phenomenon we explore here is consistent with previous
evidence from the decision-making literature. For instance,
Pitz and Geller (1970) observed a tendency to repeat previous
decisions even following disconfirming information. In a study
on reinforcement in belief-updating tasks, which was not focused
on inertia, Charness and Levin (2005) nevertheless observed a
“taste for consistency,” corresponding to the phenomenon that
people were prone to repeat their choices, no matter whether
these choices led to success or failure. In a study on perceptual
decision making, Akaishi et al. (2014) showed that choices
tend to be repeated on subsequent trials, even on the basis
of little sensory evidence. Erev and Haruvy (in press) review
studies on decision making from experience where, for instance,
participants repeatedly choose between a risky prospect and a
safe option, and receive immediate feedback (e.g., Nevo and Erev,
2012). Erev and Haruvy (in press) conclude that there exists a
strong tendency to simply repeat the most recent decision, which
is even stronger than the tendency to react optimally to the
most recent outcome. Furthermore, Zhang et al. (2014) showed
that the tendency to repeat previous decisions exists even for
unethical behavior. Theremight also be a relation to the extensive
literature on choice-induced preference change, which shows that
earlier decisions alter preferences, and hence might result in
repeated choices (see also Ariely and Norton, 2008; Sharot et al.,
2010; Alós-Ferrer et al., 2012).
The influence of previous decisions on subsequent choices has
also been investigated in reinforcement learning research. For
instance, Lau and Glimcher (2005) studied trial-by-trial behavior
of monkeys in a matching task in which the reward structure
favored alternating between two choice options. They observed
that choosing a particular alternative decreased the probability of
choosing that alternative again on the next trial, but increased the
likelihood of choosing it again some time in the future, regardless
of reward history. Studies in which participants worked on
probabilistic “bandit tasks” that favored sticking with successful
options showed that participants were prone to repeat their
choices, independently of any effects due to previous rewards
(e.g., Schönberg et al., 2007, Supplemental Results). Accordingly,
reinforcement learning models now account for the influence of
past choices on subsequent ones by including a model parameter
of “perseveration,” capturing the tendency to repeat or avoid
recently chosen actions (e.g., Schönberg et al., 2007; Gershman
et al., 2009; Wimmer et al., 2012; for an introduction to model-
based reinforcement learning, see Daw, 2012). The inclusion of
such a parameter leads to more accurate predictions in contrast
to models that merely incorporate the effect of past reinforcers
(see Lau and Glimcher, 2005).
To understand decision inertia, we consider a multiple-
process framework (Evans, 2008; Sanfey and Chang, 2008;
Weber and Johnson, 2009; Alós-Ferrer and Strack, 2014),
that is, we consider individual decisions as the result of
the interaction of multiple decision processes. Specifically, we
follow the assumptions of parallel-competitive structured process
theories, which propose that multiple processes affect behavior
simultaneously, resulting in conflict or alignment among these
processes (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Strack and Deutsch,
2004). Whenever several decision processes are in conflict
(i.e., deliver different responses), cognitive resources should be
taxed, resulting in longer response times and higher error rates.
These predictions were confirmed in a response-times study
by Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2014), which showed that more
errors arise and responses are slower when Bayesian updating
(i.e., normatively optimal behavior) is opposed to reinforcement
learning of the form “win-stay, lose-shift.” We relied on a variant
of the experimental paradigms employed in Achtziger and Alós-
Ferrer (2014), Achtziger et al. (2015), and Charness and Levin
(2005) but focused on the conflict with decision inertia, viewed as
a further decision process. Wemeasured error rates and response
times to investigate the role of decision inertia in a belief-
updating task. Specifically, we hypothesized that decision inertia
is a further process potentially conflicting with optimal behavior
and affecting decision outcomes and decision times. Accordingly,
our main hypotheses were that more errors and slower choices
would be made in cases of conflict between decision inertia and
Bayesian updating.
To further explore decision inertia, we considered possible
individual correlates of this decision process. We hypothesized
that decision inertia would be associated with preference for
consistency (PFC), which is a desire to be and look consistent
within words, beliefs, attitudes, and deeds, as measured by the
scale with the same name (Cialdini et al., 1995). Cialdini (2008)
argues that because of the tendency to be consistent, individuals
fall into the habit of being automatically consistent with previous
decisions. Once decision makers make up their minds about a
given issue, consistency allows them to not think through that
issue again, but leads them to fail to update their beliefs in the face
of new information when confronting new but similar decision
situations. Furthermore, Pitz (1969) observed that inertia in the
revision of opinions is the result of a psychological commitment
to initial judgments. Thus, we hypothesized that preference for
consistency might be one of the possible mechanisms driving
decision inertia, in which case an individual’s behavioral tendency
to rely on decision inertia should be positively associated with
their preference for consistency (PFC).
Our last hypothesis concerns the kind of decisions leading to
decision inertia. If this phenomenon arises from a tendency to be
consistent with previous decisions, and hence economize
decision costs, the effect should be stronger following
autonomous decisions (free choices) than required ones
(forced choices). The same prediction also arises from a different
perspective. In general, human decision makers prefer choice
options that they freely chose over options with equal value
that they did not choose, as exemplified by the literature on
choice-induced preference change (e.g., Lieberman et al., 2001;
Sharot et al., 2009, 2010; Alós-Ferrer et al., 2012). Relying on
behavioral and genotype data, Cockburn et al. (2014) recently
investigated the underlying mechanism of this preference. In a
probabilistic learning task, their participants demonstrated a bias
to repeat freely chosen decisions, which was limited to rewarded
vs. non-rewarded decisions. Interindividual differences in the
magnitude of this choice bias were predicted by differences
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in a gene that has been linked to reward learning and striatal
plasticity. Cockburn et al. (2014) interpret these findings as
evidence that free choices selectively amplify dopaminergic
reinforcement learning signals, based on the workings of a
feedback loop between the basal ganglia and the midbrain
dopamine system. Given such an amplification of the value of
freely chosen options, it again follows that decision inertia should
be more pronounced after autonomous decisions compared
to forced ones in our study. We make use of the fact that the
standard implementation of the paradigms we rely on includes
both forced and free choices to test this hypothesis.
2. STUDY 1
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Experimental Design
Decision making under uncertainty or risk requires integrating
different pieces of information on the possible outcomes in order
to form and update probability judgments (beliefs). From a
normative point of view, the correct combination of previous
(prior) beliefs on the probability of an uncertain event and
additional information is described by Bayes’ rule (Bayes and
Price, 1763). The present study used a two-draw decision
paradigm (Charness and Levin, 2005; Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer,
2014; Achtziger et al., 2015), where of course Bayesian updating
is the rational strategy to derive optimal decisions. There are
two urns, the Left Urn and the Right Urn, each containing 6
balls, which can be black or white. The urns are presented on the
computer screen, with masked colors for the balls. Participants
are asked to choose which urn a ball should be extracted from
(with replacement) by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard,
and are paid for drawing balls of a predefined color, say black
(the winning ball color is counterbalanced across participants).
After observing the result of the first draw, participants are
asked to choose an urn a second time, a ball is again randomly
extracted, and they are paid again if the newly extracted ball is
of the appropriate color. The payment per winning ball in our
implementation was 18 Euro cents.
The urn composition (i.e., number of black and white balls)
in Study 1 is given in Table 1 (left-hand side). The essence of the
design is that the composition varied according to a “state of the
world,” Up or Down, which was not revealed to participants. That
is, participants knew the urn compositions in each state of the
world and the fact that those were held constant for the whole
experiment. They were also informed that the prior probability of
each state was 1/2. Further, they knew that the state of the world
was constant within the two-draw decision, but was randomized
according to the prior for each new round. This means that the
first draw is uninformed, but by observing the first ball’s color the
decision maker can draw conclusions about the most likely state
of the world. Thus, for a second draw, an optimizer should choose
the urn with the highest expected payoff, given the posterior
probability of the state of the world updated through Bayes’
rule. Given the urn compositions in Study 1, straightforward
computations show that an optimizer should stay with the same
urn as in the first draw after a win and switch after a loss. For
example, if a black ball is extracted from the Left Urn, the updated
probability of being in the state “Up” is (1/2)(2/6)/((1/2)(2/6)+
(1/2)(4/6)) = 1/3, hence choosing the Left Urn again delivers
an expected payoff of (1/3)(2/6) + (2/3)(4/6) = 5/9, while
switching to the Right Urn delivers a smaller expected payoff of
(1/3)(4/6) + (2/3)(2/6) = 4/9. Note that optimizing behavior
given this particular urn composition is fully aligned with that
prescribed by an intuitive reinforcement rule (win-stay, lose-
shift); we will return to this point in Study 2. Decision inertia, on
the other hand, prescribes to always stay with the same urn as in
the first draw, independently of whether that decision resulted in
a win or a loss. Hence, Bayesian updating conflicts with decision
inertia after drawing a losing ball in the first draw.
Participants repeated the two-draw decision 60 times.
Following Charness and Levin (2005) and Achtziger and Alós-
Ferrer (2014), we included both forced first draws (where the
choice is dictated to the participant) and free first draws. This
also allows us to explore the effect of decision inertia arising
from previous autonomous choices as opposed to required
choices. To avoid confounding forced choices and learning
effects, participantsmade forced draws and free draws alternately.
2.1.2. Participants
Participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), a
standard online recruitment system for economic experiments
which allows for random recruitment from a predefined subject
pool. Participants were students from the University of Cologne.
45 participants (29 female; age range 18–32, mean 23.51)
participated in exchange for performance-based payment plus a
show-up fee of 2.50 Euros. Three further participants had to be
excluded from data analysis due to technical problems (missing
data).
2.1.3. Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for
Economic Research (CLER) using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
TABLE 1 | Urn composition in Studies 1 and 2.
Study 1 Study 2
State (Prob) Left Urn Right Urn State (Prob) Left Urn Right Urn
Up (1/2) • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦ ◦ Up (1/2) • • • • ◦ ◦ • • • • • •
Down (1/2) • • • • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Down (1/2) • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
An unknown state of the world (Up, Down) with a known prior 1/2 determines the composition of two urns (Left, Right) containing six balls each (black or white). All winning balls paid
the same independently of which urn they came from.
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Experimental procedures were in accordance with the ethical
standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki and its
later amendments, and also standard practices in experimental
economics (e.g., no-deception rule). In agreement with the ethics
and safety guidelines at the CLER, participants were all pre-
registered in the laboratory through ORSEE and had given
written informed consent regarding the laboratory’s guidelines
(no further informed consent is necessary for particular
experiments). Potential participants were informed of their right
to abstain from participation in the study or to withdraw
consent to participate at any time without reprisal. Participants
were randomly assigned to the two counterbalance conditions
(winning ball color). Before the start of the experiment,
participants read instructions and answered control questions
to ensure they understood the experiment properly. Then the
experimental task started, which lasted around 10 min. After the
task, participants filled in questionnaires including the Preference
for Consistency scale (brief 9-item version, continuously ranging
from 0 to 10; Cialdini et al., 1995) and demographic questions. A
session lasted about 1 h and average earnings were 13.85 Euros
(SD = 1.02).
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Error Rates
Mean error rates are depicted in Figure 1. The mean error rate
in case of conflict between inertia and Bayesian updating was
21.98% (SD = 20.91%), vs. just 10.18% (SD = 17.43%) in
case of alignment. To test for differences in the distribution
of individual-level error rates, here and elsewhere in the paper
we rely on non-parametric, two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed-Rank
tests (WSR). The difference is highly significant (median error
rate 15.63% in case of conflict, 5.26% in case of alignment;
N = 45, z = 3.79, p < 0.001). When we split the tests
conditional on forced draws and free draws, the result holds both
for forced draws (median error rate 14.29% in case of conflict
(mean 21.31%, SD = 23.12%), 6.67% in case of alignment (mean
FIGURE 1 | Study 1. Mean of individual error rates in case of alignment (light
gray) and conflict (dark gray) between Bayesian updating and inertia. Error
bars represent standard errors. ***p < 0.01.
11.56%, SD = 17.62%); WSR test, z = 2.89, p = 0.004) and
free draws (median error rate 17.65% in case of conflict (mean
23.68%, SD = 22.56%), 0% in case of alignment (mean 8.84%,
SD = 18.03%); WSR test, z = 3.94, p < 0.001). Paired t-tests
provide similar results, but since error rates are not normally
distributed we favor WSR tests, which are ordinal in nature.
We rely on standard WSR tests that adjust for zero differences,
but results are highly similar when using WSR tests that ignore
zero differences. Furthermore, to test the robustness of the WSR
results, we additionally ran a two-way ANOVA (Factor 1: conflict
with inertia vs. alignment with inertia; Factor 2: forced draw
vs. free draw) on log-transformed error rates. Since several
participants had error rates of 0% (which is commonly observed
in the present paradigm), we used the log(x + 1) transformation
following Bartlett (1947) to be able to deal with zero values. The
ANOVA results were consistent with the results based on the
WSR test, showing a significant main effect of conflict with vs.
alignment with inertia, but no main effect of forced vs. free draw
and no interaction.
2.2.2. Response Times
Second-draw responses were significantly longer in case of
conflict with inertia (median 973 ms, mean 1119 ms, SD =
447 ms) than in case of alignment (median 903 ms, mean 1001
ms, SD = 319 ms). We tested the difference in distributions
with a WSR test on individual average response times (N =
45, z = 2.13, p = 0.033). However, the result only holds for
free draws (conflict: median 933 ms, mean 1048 ms, SD = 478
ms; alignment: median 787 ms, mean 840 ms, SD = 289 ms;
z = 3.54, p < 0.001), but not for forced draws (conflict: median
1038 ms, mean 1191 ms, SD = 478 ms; alignment: median 1069
ms, mean 1179 ms, SD = 440 ms; z = −0.06, p = 0.951). We
further ran a two-way ANOVA (Factor 1: conflict with inertia
vs. alignment with inertia; Factor 2: forced draw vs. free draw)
on log-transformed response times (since the distribution of
response times was skewed). Results were consistent with the
WSR test, showing significant main effects of both factors and
a significant interaction effect.
2.3. Discussion
The results of Study 1 support the idea that decision inertia
corresponds to an automatic process conflicting with Bayesian
updating, thereby affecting decision performance and decision
times. In particular, more errors were made when Bayesian
updating and decision inertia delivered different responses.
Additionally, after free draws decisions were significantly slower
when Bayesian updating and decision inertia were opposed
compared to when they were aligned. However, this decision-
times evidence of a decision conflict was not observed after forced
draws, suggesting that the effect of decision inertia might be
stronger following voluntary choices.
3. STUDY 2
Study 2 investigated decision inertia in a more complex setting,
where more than two decision processes are in conflict. Previous
studies (Charness and Levin, 2005; Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer,
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2014; Achtziger et al., 2015) have shown that in probability-
updating paradigms, reinforcement processes (cued by winning
or losing in the first draw) play a relevant role. Reinforcement
roughly corresponds to the psychological Law of Effect: the
propensity to adopt an action increases when it leads to a
success and decreases when it leads to a failure (Thorndike, 1911;
Sutton and Barto, 1998). Charness and Levin (2005) introduced
the “reinforcement heuristic” as a decision rule, defined as a
simple “win-stay, lose-shift” behavioral principle which might
give different prescriptions than Bayesian updating and thereby
produce errors. In fact, Charness and Levin (2005) observed error
rates above 50% when the heuristic conflicted with Bayes’ rule,
which demonstrates that reinforcement has a significant impact
on individuals’ decision making. By analyzing response times,
Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2014) showed that reinforcement is
a rather automatic process conflicting with the more controlled
process of Bayesian updating. In Study 1, due to the distribution
of balls in the two urns, Bayesian updating and reinforcement
were always aligned, and hence our analysis could not be
confounded by a conflict with reinforcement. In Study 2 we
aimed to test if inertia still plays a role when reinforcement
additionally conflicts with Bayesian updating. We used the same
experimental paradigm as in Study 1, but with a different urn
composition, resulting in two kinds of (endogenous) decision
situations. In the first kind, Bayesian updating and reinforcement
were aligned, allowing for a conceptual replication of Study 1. In
the second kind, there was a conflict between Bayesian updating
and reinforcement.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Experimental Design
The experimental task differs from Study 1 only (but crucially) in
the urn composition, which is shown inTable 1 (right-hand side).
Given this composition, choosing the Right Urn in the first draw
reveals the state of the world and the decision for the second draw
is straightforward, i.e., win-stay, lose-shift. That is, as in Study
1, both Bayesian updating and the reinforcement heuristic give
the same prescription, but decision inertia conflicts with Bayesian
updating after drawing a losing ball from this urn. Choosing the
Left Urn in the first draw leads to a different situation. Given
the posterior probability updated through Bayes’ rule, Bayesian
updating prescribes to stay after a loss and to switch after a win
(win-shift, lose-stay), which is opposed to the prescriptions of
reinforcement. Further, Bayesian updating conflicts with inertia
after drawing a winning ball (but not after drawing a losing
ball). Thus, after starting with Left there are situations where
reinforcement and decision inertia are aligned and both conflict
with Bayesian updating.
3.1.2. Participants and Procedure
Forty-four participants (25 female; age range: 19–31, mean 23.80)
were recruited using the same enrollment method, experimental
procedures, and payment rules as in Study 1. Average earnings
were 14.29 Euros (SD = 0.78). Four further participants had to
be excluded from data analysis due to technical problems.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Error Rates
Figures 2, 3 depict the means of individual-level error rates
depending on the type of draws in Study 2. The results
for situations with no conflict between Bayesian updating
and reinforcement (the Right Urn situations; Figure 2) were
analogous to those of Study 1. In this case, error rates are
naturally very low, because reinforcement learning prescribes
the correct answer (e.g., Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer, 2014). In
situations where Bayesian updating conflicts with reinforcement
(the Left Urn situations; Figure 3), error rates were considerably
higher than under alignment with reinforcement. The observed
error rates are highly similar to those found in previous
studies using the same decision task (Charness and Levin,
2005; Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer, 2014; Achtziger et al., 2015).
FIGURE 2 | Study 2. Mean of individual error rates in case of alignment (light
gray) and conflict (dark gray) between Bayesian updating and inertia, for the
situations where Bayesian updating is aligned with reinforcement (first draw
from the Right Urn). Error bars represent standard errors. **p < 0.05.
FIGURE 3 | Study 2. Mean of individual error rates in case of alignment (light
gray) and conflict (dark gray) between Bayesian updating and inertia, for the
situations where Bayesian updating conflicts with reinforcement (first draw
from the Left Urn). Error bars represent standard errors. ***p < 0.01.
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The high error rates can be explained by the automaticity
of the reinforcement process, which seems to be highly
dominant for some participants. Interestingly, when looking
at individual data, one observes only few error rates in the
50% range, but rather one cluster of participants with error
rates below 1/3, and another cluster with rates above 2/3.
This points to interindividual heterogeneity (see Achtziger
et al., 2015), but speaks against the possibility that participants
responded randomly.
Turning back to our hypotheses regarding decision inertia,
consider first decision situations where Bayesian updating and
reinforcement are aligned. In this case, the mean error rate in
case of conflict between decision inertia and Bayesian updating
(further supported by reinforcement) was 5.37% (SD = 11.67%),
while in case of alignment between those two processes (hence
alignment among all three processes) it was only 1.36% (SD =
5.31%). Although all medians were at a 0% error rate, the
difference in distributions was significant (WSR test,N = 44, z =
2.57, p = 0.010). This result holds both for forced draws (conflict:
median 0%, mean 6.19%, SD = 15.17%; alignment: median 0%,
mean 1.29%, SD = 5.13%; WSR test, N = 43, z = 2.21, p =
0.027) and free draws (conflict: median 0%, mean 4.71%, SD =
10.52%; alignment: median 0%, mean 1.78%, SD = 7.14%; WSR
test, N = 43, z = 2.31, p = 0.021). Note that for free draws
N is reduced due to a participant who avoided starting with
the Right Urn when first draws were free, and hence provided
no data for this particular comparison. We also excluded this
participant from the corresponding analysis for forced draws to
ensure that the subset of participants for the analysis of both
draw types was the same. As in Study 1, we additionally ran a
two-way ANOVA on the transformed error rates as a robustness
check. The pattern of results was consistent with the WSR tests,
showing a significant main effect of conflict with vs. alignment
with inertia, but no main effect of forced vs. free draw and
no interaction.
Consider now the situations where Bayesian updating
conflicts with reinforcement (the Left Urn situations; Figure 3).
In this case, error rates for the cases of conflict and alignment
of Bayesian updating with decision inertia were similar (mean
49.92% (SD = 36.15%) and 55.61% (SD = 31.44%), respectively).
The difference was not significant (median in case of conflict
48.81%, in case of alignment 62.02%; WSR test, N = 44, z =
−0.86, p = 0.391). If we consider only free draws, as we expected,
there are more errors in case of conflict between Bayesian
updating and inertia (mean 74.19%, SD = 34.08%) than in case
of alignment (mean 48.08%, SD = 34.23%). The difference in
distributions is significant (median in case of conflict 90%, in
case of alignment 50%; WSR test, N = 25, z = 2.73, p =
0.006). The extraordinarily high error rates in case of conflict
are revealing but intuitive, for in this case the correct normative
response is opposed to positive reinforcement, that is, inertia
actually prescribes to merely repeat a successful choice. Note
that in this case the test needs to exclude the participants who
avoided starting with Left when first draws were free, and hence
provided no data for this particular comparison (indeed, this
possibility is the original reason for including forced draws in
the design). Again, we also excluded these participants from the
corresponding analysis for forced draws. If we consider only
forced draws, however, the difference of error rates between the
case of conflict with inertia and the case of alignment with inertia
is not significant (medians 66.67% in case of conflict (mean
63.26%, SD = 33.13%), 66.67% in case of alignment (mean
60.16%, SD = 27.61%); WSR test, N = 25, z = 0.59, p = 0.554).
An additional ANOVA on the transformed error rates yielded
results consistent with the WSR tests, showing a significant
interaction effect, but no main effects of either factor.
3.2.2. Response Times
In situations where Bayesian updating is aligned with
reinforcement (the Right Urn situations), as expected, responses
were slower in case of conflict between Bayesian updating and
inertia (median 878 ms, mean 1025 ms, SD = 503 ms) than in
case of alignment (median 666 ms, mean 905 ms, SD = 698 ms).
The WSR test was significant (N = 44, z = 3.76, p < 0.001).
This result holds for both forced draws (conflict: median 943 ms,
mean 1136 ms, SD = 530 ms; alignment: median 744 ms, mean
961 ms, SD = 702 ms; WSR test, N = 43, z = 2.98, p = 0.003)
and free draws (conflict: median 796 ms, mean 1031 ms,
SD = 927 ms; alignment: median 623 ms, mean 896 ms,
SD = 1141 ms; WSR test, N = 43, z = 3.48, p < 0.001). An
additional ANOVA on log-transformed data yielded results
consistent with the WSR tests, showing a significant main effect
of conflict with vs. alignment with inertia and a significant
main effect of forced vs. free draw, but no significant effect of
interaction.
In situations where Bayesian updating conflicts with
reinforcement (the Left Urn situations), there is no significant
difference between the response times in case of conflict between
Bayesian updating and inertia (median 1579 ms, mean 1919 ms,
SD = 1237 ms) and the response times in case of alignment
(median 1595 ms, mean 2123 ms, SD = 1449 ms; WSR test,
N = 44, z = −0.70, p = 0.484). The same result holds when the
test is made conditional on free draws (conflict: median 926 ms,
mean 1543ms, SD = 1295ms; alignment: median 1019ms, mean
1376 ms, SD = 770 ms; WSR test, N = 25, z = 0.58, p = 0.563).
In forced draws, the results showed that the response times in
case of conflict with inertia (median 1671 ms, mean 1971 ms,
SD = 1438 ms) were faster than in case of alignment with inertia
(median 2182 ms, mean 2427 ms, SD = 1347 ms; WSR test,
N = 25, z = −2.19, p = 0.028). An additional ANOVA on the
transformed error rates yielded results consistent with the WSR
tests, showing a significant main effect of forced vs. free draw,
but no main effect of conflict vs. alignment with inertia and no
interaction.
3.3. Discussion
In decision situations without additional conflict due to
reinforcement, which are comparable to Study 1, the results
show that more errors and slower responses are made in case
of conflict between Bayesian updating and decision inertia in
both forced and free draws, confirming that decision inertia exists
for both required and autonomous choices. This replicates the
results of Study 1. When decisions are made in the presence
of a conflict between Bayesian updating and reinforcement, our
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results suggest that decision inertia is only present for the case of
voluntary (autonomous) previous choices, and even in that case
evidence on response times is inconclusive. Our interpretation
is that decision inertia is a subtle process, which might be
partially washed out when reinforcement conflicts with Bayesian
updating.
4. DECISION INERTIA AND PREFERENCE
FOR CONSISTENCY
We now investigate the proposed relationship between inertia
and preference for consistency (PFC). At the same time, based
on the insights from Studies 1 and 2, we examine more closely
whether the effect of decision inertia varies according to the
type of decisions (forced vs. free). We measured PFC through
the corresponding scale after the decision-making part of the
experiment was completed. The average PFC score in our data
was 4.28 (SD = 1.86). Internal consistency as measured by
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.83. To uncover the associations between
decision inertia and PFC, and between decision inertia and
decision autonomy, we ran random-effects probit regressions on
second-draw errors for the data from both studies (see Table 2).
These regressions allow us to control for a variety of other
variables like round number, counterbalancing, and conflict with
reinforcement (in Study 2). The results show that in both studies,
the interaction effect of conflict with inertia and the PFC score
is significantly positive, indicating that in case of conflict with
inertia, a higher PFC score is associated with an increased
probability of errors, which is consistent with our assumption.
In addition, in both studies, the interaction effect of conflict with
inertia and forced draws is significantly negative, that is, the
effect of decision inertia is stronger in free draws than in forced
draws.
5. GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study shows that decision inertia plays a role in human
decision making under risk and investigates the underlying
processes. We find a significant tendency to repeat previous
choices in decision making with monetary feedback. Specifically,
we found evidence for the existence of decision inertia in Study
1 and in decision situations without conflict with reinforcement
in Study 2. In contrast, in the Left-Urn situations in Study 2,
where reinforcement conflicts with Bayesian updating, we only
found an effect of decision inertia after autonomous choices.
We conclude that decision inertia seems to be subtle and
easily overshadowed by stronger processes as e.g., reinforcement
learning.
We hypothesized that decision inertia would be positively
associated with PFC. The regression analysis confirms this
hypothesis, indicating that the tendency to repeat past choices is
a relevant part of the need to be consistent. This finding agrees
with those of Pitz (1969), who showed that the inertia effect in
opinion revision results from a psychological commitment to
one’s initial judgments. It is not consistent with the results of
Zhang et al. (2014, Study 2b), who found no relation between
repetition of earlier decisions and PFC scores. However, Zhang
et al. (2014) targeted unethical decisions and hence their setting
is hard to compare to ours. The moral framing of the decisions in
that work might have interacted with the hypothesized need for
consistency. Our results for free vs. forced draws provide further
evidence that decision inertia might (at least partly) be based on
a mechanism of consistency-seeking. Both of our studies suggest
that the effect of decision inertia might vary according to the
type of first-draw decisions. The results of the regression analyses
confirm this idea, indicating that decision inertia is significantly
stronger in autonomous choices than in required ones. Since
one would assume that a psychological desire to be consistent
TABLE 2 | Random-effects probit regressions on second-draw errors (1 = error) in Studies 1 and 2.
Variable Study 1 Study 2
(1) (2) (1) (2)
β(SE) p β(SE) p β(SE) p β(SE) p
ConflictR(1 = Yes) 2.33(0.09)*** < 0.001 2.43(0.10)*** < 0.001
ConflictI(1 = Yes) 0.19(0.17) 0.27 0.34(0.18)* 0.07 −0.34(0.22) 0.11 0.24(0.24) 0.32
PFC −0.01(0.07) 0.92 −0.01(0.07) 0.92 0.11(0.06)∗ 0.08 0.11(0.07) 0.10
TrialNr −0.31(0.12)*** 0.007 −0.31(0.12)*** 0.007 −0.30(0.13)** 0.02 −0.25(0.13)* 0.06
Cb −0.38(0.24) 0.12 −0.37(0.24) 0.13 0.16(0.20) 0.43 0.16(0.21) 0.44
ConflictI × PFC 0.11(0.04)*** 0.005 0.11(0.04)*** 0.005 0.13(0.04)*** 0.004 0.14(0.04)*** 0.002
Forced(1 = Yes) 0.20(0.11)* 0.06 0.54(0.12)*** < 0.001
ConflictI × Forced −0.29(0.14)** 0.035 −1.03(0.16)*** < 0.001
Constant −1.23(0.31)*** < 0.001 −1.34(0.31)*** <0.001 −2.84(0.34)*** < 0.001 −3.27(0.37)*** < 0.001
Wald chi2 97.54*** < 0.001 100.56*** <0.001 617.22*** < 0.001 606.42*** < 0.001
Log likelihood −954.66 −952.37 −780.66 −759.57
No. of Obs. 2700 2700 2640 2640
ConflictR is a dummy referring to conflict between Bayesian updating and reinforcement. ConflictI is a dummy referring to conflict between Bayesian updating and inertia. Cb is the
counterbalance dummy. *p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.001.
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with one’s own decisions is stronger for self-selected compared to
assigned decisions, this result further supports an interpretation
of decision inertia as a facet of consistency-seeking.
Our results are also in agreement with the reinforcement
learning literature (e.g., Schönberg et al., 2007; Gershman et al.,
2009;Wimmer et al., 2012) which has pointed out the importance
of perseveration as an additional factor. A direct comparison is
of course difficult, because in our paradigm success probabilities
are explicitly given (and priors are reset after every round), while
in the quoted works they are discovered through experience.
However, the basic messages are similar. As in those previous
reports, we find that the mere repetition of previous choices
plays a role even when behavior is mostly determined by
the interaction of reinforcement and normative goals. In that
sense, we confirm (in a different setting) that incorporating
perseveration intomodels of reinforcement learning can improve
our understanding of how errors occur.
In conclusion, we find clear evidence for the existence of
decision inertia in incentivized decision making. Our study sheds
light on the process underlying decision inertia, by showing
that this behavioral tendency is positively associated with an
individual’s preference for consistency, and that the effect of
decision inertia is stronger in voluntary choices than in required
choices.
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